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A  S H O R T  H I S T O R Y  
 
In this contribution I would like to focus on the four countries in South Asia, India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as a region of conflicts, ask questions about 
the specific conflict constellations existing in the region and by applying indicator 
oriented empirical research to the four countries I try to explain the political 
confrontations occurring during the period between 1945 and 2002. 
 
T h e  p r o f i l e s  o f  t h e  S o u t h  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  
 
The political history – foremost the colonial history – and the international 
environment of the region determined the demographic, ethnic, religious, economic 
and political map of each of the countries. The various waves of conquest, imperial 
domination by regional and international powers as well as internal struggles have 
shaped the conflictual map and, as a result, have run the risk of becoming a site of 
endemic conflicts (see below). 
Thus the four countries of South Asia can not only be seen from their regional 
and international environment, nor can it be seen as an homogeneous entity with a 
regional organization of its own. East and Southeast Asian countries influenced 
their conflict behavior as well as the former superpowers of the United Kingdom, 
the Soviet Union and today’s superpower of the USA. The internal diversities, the 
regional rivalries and the power struggle between the influence seeking powers 
made this region one of the most conflict driven of the globe. In addition, each of 
the four countries has internal sub-national confrontations. 
There are examples of violent quarrels and there are examples of peaceful 
settlements. Foremost to mention the conflict intense quarrel between Pakistan  and  
                                                 
1 Prof. em. Dr. Pfetsch is Jean-Monnet Professor emeritus at the Institute of Political 
Science, Ruprecht-Karls-University, Heidelberg. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the panel on “Nuclear Capacities in South Asia”, at the 17th European 
Conference on Modern South Asian Studies, held in Heidelberg, September 11, 2002. 
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India about Kashmir, the internal conflicts of various groups about autonomy in 
India and Pakistan and the long standing strife for independence/autonomy of the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. 
The demographic differences are quite remarkable: there are countries with 
high population figures like India with almost 1 billion inhabitants (that will 
become the most populated country in the world in the near future) and there is the 
small country Sri Lanka with only 19 million people. Population density amounts 
to 1 (Pakistan with 175 people per square meter) to about 6 (Bangladesh with 981 
people per square meter). The difference as to the per capita income amounts to 
approximately 1 (Bangladesh with 1475 US$ p.c.) to 2 (Sri Lanka with 3056 US$ 
p.c.). Two countries can be called democracies and two have so called transitional 
regimes. As to the religious composition only Pakistan and Bangladesh with 
approximately 97% and 87% Moslems possess a rather homogeneous monotheistic 
religion; the others have various religious settings, i.e. India with 83% Hindus, 
11% Moslems, 2% Christians and Sikhs each; only 1% are Buddhists. Sri Lanka 
has approximately 70% Buddhists, 14% Hindus, 8% Christians and 6% Moslems. 
Since the beginning of modern times the Western World tried to export its 
civilization through imperial and colonial policies; also Islam through its conquests 
of Pakistan and India had some influence on the respective cultures. This 
civilizational split has been expressed by Samuel Huntington as the clash of 
civilizations. Each country has its own international or/and regional affiliation; 
after independence India inclined more towards the Soviet Union, whereas 
Pakistan strengthened its political links with China and lately with the United 
States. 
The analysis of the region as a conflict region will be based on the following 
model of conflict development and determination. 
This article is structured according to the following logic: First of all, the 
structural reality of a country’s endangerment/insecurity and support/security as 
well as - deduced from this - its ability to resolve conflicts are operationalized and 
put into measurable quantities. In this way we identify the regime’s political 
management capabilities and, independent of the measurements mentioned before, 
its character. Then, the variable ‘conflict’, which is to be explained, is presented 
and the modality of resolving conflicts is considered. Finally, an index of 
resolution is calculated that shows which states and which regimes can or could 
respectively best deal with conflicts. At the same time, the index serves to identify 
specifically endangered states and through pointing out the supporting factors to 
discuss the possibilities of non-violent ways to resolve conflicts. 
 
 
A  D Y N A M I C  P H A S E - M O D E L  
 
The very basic and crude form of our dynamic conflict model is shown in figure 1 
below. Each conflict passes through the three phases of initiation, escalation and 
eventually resolution of conflicts. The escalation phase starts with a latent conflict, 
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followed by a crisis, both still in a non-violent stage; then followed by the violent 
phases with a severe crisis and finally a war.2 
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Actors are on the one hand under stress from the environment and on the other 
driven by forces in support. Our empirical analysis is focused on the calculation of 
conflicts that have occurred in the region under consideration as the dependent 
variable and operationalized factors that as independent variables are meant to 
explain the conflict behavior of each of the states.  
 
 
T H E  P O L I T I C A L  M A P  S I N C E  1 9 4 5 .  T H E  D E P E N D E N T  
V A R I A B L E  ‘ C O N F L I C T S ’  
 
Since 1945, considerable changes have taken place on the global political map and 
in corresponding political conflict patterns. As a result, many theoretical and 
methodological approaches to empirical conflict research are loosing focus and are 
becoming increasingly inadequate to meet the new realities of conflict 
developments. 
As principal changes that have taken place in the global political realm since 
1945 we identify the following developments with their implications on the 
political, military, economic and socio-cultural global map for the South Asian 
countries: 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For explanation, see legend of Figure 2. 
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• the multiplication of the number of states. Also in the South Asian region new 
countries emerged after World War II during the process of decolonisation and 
as a matter of fact the decolonisation process started with the independence of 
India; 
• the spread in number and scope of international and transnational 
organizations. Internationally the countries of the region did not organize 
themselves into an organizational framework; 
• the growth of world production and world trade. The effects of globalisation 
and regionalization are not easy to determine. Economic interdependencies are 
given by Europe’s dependence on oil and gas supplies; 
• the end of the Cold War and changes in political systems and ideologies (‘new 
world order’, ‘new world disorder’, ‘end of ideology’, ‘clash of civilizations’ 
etc.) and with it the end of superpower rivalry as well as the end of the arms 
race. The end of the Cold War changed the priorities given to the various 
countries in the region; 
• the decline of naive and brute power- and prestige-politics in some parts of the 
region - especially outside the OECD world - power politics is still the practice 
of the day; 
• a new type of violence that may be called ‘privatised’ violence has been 
expressed by Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist attacks. 
 
As described elsewhere3 we define conflict as the clashing of overlapping interests 
(positional differences) around national values and issues 
(decolonisation/independence/secession, self-determination, borders and territory, 
access to or distribution of domestic or international power, ideology, resources); 
the conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, 
groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue 
their interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state. Possible 
instruments used in the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative 
decisions, threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical 
violence and war. We assume that each conflict passes through four phases of 
development: from latent conflict to crisis, to severe crisis and to war depending on 
its intensity.4 The criteria to distinguish one conflict from another are firstly the 
participants, secondly the issues and thirdly the intensity. If one of these features 
changes then we count it as a separate conflict. 
The identification of specific features of a conflict starts with the idea that - all 
differences acknowledged - every conflict can be described with features which are 
common to all conflicts. In our data bank KOSIMO we have selected 28 variables 
which describe 693 conflicts that have occurred between 1945 and 1998. To quote 
                                                 
3 Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. Kosimo: A Databank on Political Conflict. In: 
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp. 379-389; the data bank can be down-
loaded at www.kosimo.de. 
4 For definitions, see Figure 2. 
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only some categories: start and end, parties involved, regime type, issues in 
dispute, modalities of conflict resolution, fatalities etc.  
Compared to other quantitative approaches5 in conflict analysis the KOSIMO-
databank focuses on the following aspects: it counts international as well as 
national conflicts; it is state centred, but takes also into account non-state actors; it 
is dynamic in the sense that it assumes four stages of conflict escalation.6 
 
C o n f l i c t s  i n  a n d  a m o n g  t h e  S o u t h  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  
 
We now consider more closely the conflict situation in four states of South Asia. 
We do this by the empirical analysis of the conflicts as they occurred in the region 
after World War II (See Appendix III). 
 
Table 1: Number of conflicts according to countries, weighted and unweighted  
 
Countries Latent Conflict 
 
Crises Severe Crises Wars Total 
 No. weighted No. weighted No. weighted No. weighted No. weighted 
Bangladesh 2 2 3 6 3 9 1 4 9 21 
India 1 1 7 14 15 45 5 20 28 80 
Pakistan 0 0 3 6 8 24 4 16 15 46 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 2 6 3 12 5 18 
 
Table 1 shows that India as the biggest country and with a highly diversified 
population is the most conflict driven country with altogether 28 conflicts (See also 
Appendix II). This country holds the record also with the weighting scores, that 
add up to 80 points.7 Next to India there is Pakistan with altogether 15 conflicts and 
                                                 
5 A comparative study by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Sven Chojnacki. Sept. 2001. 
(Scientific Necessity and Political Utility. A Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts; 
Wissenschaftszentrum P01-304) on the four quantitative approaches to the study of war, 
that by David Singer: the Correlates of War (COW) University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
now resettled at th University of Pennsylvania with Stuart A. Bremer; Peter Wallensteen: 
Conflict Data Project (CDP), Uppsala, Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel: AKUF and Frank Pfetsch: 
KOSIMO Heidelberg shows differences and similarities between the projects. This has to 
do with differences of definitions, differences in coding procedures, and differences in 
theoretical underpinnings. One shortcoming is a lack of data on non-violent conflicts; a 
second shortcoming of present day conflict research is the lack of systematized data on 
domestic conflicts. Related to the problem of operationalizing sub-national actors is the 
reliance on states as unitary and principal actors. This has become a third general drawback 
of databanks on conflicts. A fourth deficit is the lack of compatibility among existing 
databanks. Thus, KOSIMO made on the one hand use of existing information on conflicts, 
which were being transformed into the concepts developed in the project, and on the other 
hand, it was filled with data on additional conflicts through our own empirical research 
(Pfetsch, Frank R. and Peter Billing. 1994. Handbuch nationaler und internationaler 
Konflikte. Baden-Baden: Nomos; Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. 2000. National and 
International Conflicts. New Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. London et al.: Routledge. 
6 Apart from the yearly update of the KOSIMO databank (available under www.HIIK.de), 
we publish at the end of each year a ‘Konfliktbarometer’ indicating the conflict activities 
during the year of consideration, available under www.Konfliktbarometer.de.  
7 We weight latent conflicts with the factor 1, crises with 2, severe crises with 3 and wars 
with factor 4. 
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a weighted score of 46. Bangladesh with 9 (weighted 21) and Sri Lanka with 5 
(weighted 18). 
 Figure 2 shows that the South Asian region as a whole is a rather conflict 
intensive region; during the 57 years after the end of World War II we count 44 
conflicts all together, 31 violent with 9 wars and 13 non-violent conflicts.8 
Most of the conflict occurred within and external to India as the biggest and 
most populated country. There are deep social, economic, cultural and political 
developments that endanger the Indian polity. There is, foremost, the difference 
between the two biggest religious groups of the Hindus and the Moslems, followed 
by differences between the central government and the regions some of which 
demanding autonomy such as that in Assam or even separation such as the Sikhs in 
Punjab. There are much more potentially or/and actually diversified regions that 
cause strain to the central government. The most overt and enduring conflict with 
two wars and various threats of war since 1947 has been, of course, that between 
India and Pakistan about Kashmir with its heterogeneous divided population.9 
Besides this international and regional conflict there are internal disputes about 
autonomy and secession; to mention only the most open and visible that of Assam 
with its originally about 200 ethnic and linguistic groups (since 1973), some of 
them like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) or the National Socialist 
Council of Nagaland (NSCN) demanding independence from the central 
government; there is also the Khalistan movement of the Sikhs in region of Punjab 
demanding autonomy (since 1981). The confrontation between Hindu nationalists, 
organized in the Bharatiya Party, and Moslems lead to the so called Ayodhya 
conflict (1984) that was initiated by various incidents.10 
 
                                                 
8 Reminder: the numbers are not identical with the numbers that indicate the participants, 
since in bilateral conflicts both participants are counted. 
9 Descriptions can be found in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1990. Konflikte seit 1945. Volume 
on ‘Asien, Australien und Ozeanien’; pp. 78-83, and in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1996. 
Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995, pp. 128-131.  
10 More detailed descriptions, see Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1995. Globales 
Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995, pp. 156-159. 
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Figure 2: Conflict intensities 
 
Conflict Intensities 1945-2002 of India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan
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Legend: Latent conflict is a stage in the development of a conflict where one or more 
groups, parties or states question existing values, issues or objectives that have a national 
relevance. Latent conflicts must carry some identifiable and observable signs in order to be 
recognized as such. The positional differences and the clashing interests in a latent conflict 
must be articulated as demands or claims.  
A crisis is defined as tensions that are expressed by means below the threshold of violence. 
Tense relations between the parties can reach a turning-point from where the use of force 
may become more likely. Economic sanctions, for example, are a means by which a latent 
conflict can be turned into a crisis. A crisis is - like a latent conflict - at all stages carried 
out by nonviolent means.  
A severe crisis is defined as a state of high tension between two parties; they either threaten 
to resort to the use of force or they actually use physical or military force sporadically. The 
use of force in severe crisis must be limited to occasional border incidents, sea- or land-
blockades, partial territorial occupations, brief arrests of people, e.g. opposition-leaders, or 
the confiscation of goods. 
War: For operational reasons, we define war as a form of violent mass-conflict that is 
characterized by: the fighting of at least two opponents with organized, regular military 
forces; the fighting is not sporadic; it lasts for a considerable period of time and the 
fighting is intense, that is, it leads to victims and destruction. The number of victims and the 
scope of destruction is high. 
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Another longstanding (since 1956) internal conflict with external participation is 
that in Sri Lanka between the Tamil minority living in the North and North-East of 
Sri Lanka and organized in various groups and/or parties Tamil Eelam (Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE; Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, TELO; 
People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, PLOTE; Tamil United 
Liberation Front, TULF) and other Tamil groups like the Sri Lanka Moslem 
Congress SLMC.11 Lately this conflict de-escalated but still seems far away from a 
solution. 
As to Bangladesh, besides the border conflicts with India and Myanmar there is 
the strife for autonomy in the North of the country by regional groupings at the 
Chittagong Hill Tracks (since 1991) and the rivalry between opposition groups and 
the central government since 1991. 
Finally, in Pakistan besides the already mentioned Kashmir conflict there are 
various political and/or religious groups, foremost the Sindhs, that destabilize the 
central government. Also the September 11 event put much strain on the central 
government that had to deal with the Afghan Taliban refugees on the one hand and 
with the international community, foremost the United States in their fight against 
terrorism. 
 
There are differences as to the severity of such conflicts (see Figure 3):  
 
• The most frequent, rather old standing and mostly violent type of conflict in 
this region was that within the countries on ethnic, religious and regional 
autonomy with 20 conflicts followed by 15 equally mostly violent colonial and 
independence conflicts, most of them occurring in multicultural India. 
• Partly as a relict of the colonial era, partly as a consequence of state building 
thereafter, there are 14 border and territorial disputes between India and 
Pakistan, India and China, both of which were often violently disputed.  
• There are 4 more recent types of conflict related to resources. 
• Three major categories concern conflicts related to specific countries, i.e. first 
of all the 28 different conflicts within and external to India; secondly the 
conflicts within and exterior to Pakistan with altogether 15 conflicts mainly 
concerning Kashmir, then the mainly internal conflicts in Bangladesh and Sri 
Lanka. 
• It is remarkable that no one issue in dispute was more non-violent than violent; 
in all the categories mentioned violence prevailed over non-violence. 
                                                 
11 Detailed descriptions in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1990. Konflikte seit 1945. Volume on 
‘Asien, Australien und Ozeanien’, pp. 142-150 and in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1995. 
Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995, pp. 144-147. 
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Figure 3: Issues by intensity 
Items and Issues by Intensities in Conflicts between 1945-2002 in India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan
3 3
6
1 1 1
2
1
10
12
14
2
7
4
3
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
13 15 20 3 8 5 5 1
Territory Decolonization Ethnic, religious
or regional
autonomy
Ideology National Power International
Power
Resources Other
Item/Issue
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
on
fli
cts
Nonviolent Conflicts
Violent Conflicts
 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:  CHALLENGES AND 
SUPPORT 
 
As explanatory factors we concentrate on three clusters of factors: on stress 
indicators such as minorities (Gurr-Index, Vanhanen-Index), threats 
(military expenditures), political instability (refugees), unconstitutional 
changes (coups d’états), on support indicators such as integration in the 
surrounding environment (member of regional and international 
organizations, export quota), acceptance of the regime (participation in 
elections) or factors describing its governance (political stability and 
efficiency of governments); independently calculated the regime type is also 
of relevance (democratic, dictatorial, transitional); finally, we deduce from 
this the potential a country possesses in the management of conflicts.12 By 
potential we mean the difference of calculated system supporting indicators 
and system challenging indicators. The positive values of the index 
constructed indicate a surplus of supporting compared to challenging 
factors. 
  There are also political challenges that emerged from within and among 
the countries of the region, that are not necessarily and explicitly expressed 
with the indicators selected such as 
                                                 
12 Pfetsch, Frank R. Konfliktbewältigung von Demokratien und Diktaturen. Vortrag Institut 
für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität Heidelberg, Mai 2002; see also Appendix I. 
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• historically based mistrust and friction among ethnic groups; 
• aggressive nationalism and sub-nationalism; 
• social disruption in the light of radical economic reforms; 
• Islamic fundamentalism; 
• drug-trafficking; 
• ecological threats; 
• proliferation of biological and mass-destruction weapons. 
 
From the numerous factors leading to war and peace, those which allow their 
operationalization and the transformation into measurable quantities are chosen. 
We assume that, by this, we capture the most relevant factors. The goal consists in 
establishing a priority list with all the countries on the globe according to the 
degree of their endangerment, support and resolution potential, and making it 
possible to anticipate the prognosis of the future of a state’s conflict behaviour. 
This way, the dynamically applied model can serve as orientation for the 
interdependence of actions and effects, and for logical argumentations respectively. 
 
S o u t h  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  s t r e s s  i n d i c a t o r s  
 
By grouping the challenging factors according to their degree of challenge we 
notice that in the nineties the most challenged countries have been India and the 
two neighbouring countries of Bangladesh and Pakistan (Tab. 2). The relatively 
(compared to the other three countries in consideration) most stable country with 
less threat is Sri Lanka. But on the whole, the index of challenge is for all of the 
four countries relatively high compared to the 158 additional countries for which 
the index was also calculated (for indicators, see Appendix I). 
Whereas terrorist Islamic fundamentalism, migration, drug-trafficking, 
weapons of mass destruction are seen as threats to the outside world, social 
disruption, frictions among ethnic groups, sub-nationalism and the ecology are 
more threats internal to the four countries. 
 
S o u t h  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  a n d  
m a n a g e m e n t  c a p a b i l i t y  i n d i c a t o r s  
 
As to the potential support or security indicators the scale of indices ranges from 
higher ranked Sri Lanka and India (with rank 43, 45 and 49 for Sri Lanka, India 
and Bangladesh out of 162 states counted) as potentially best equipped countries to 
the lesser equipped country of Pakistan. 
 
S o u t h  A s i a n  c o u n t r i e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e i r  m a n a g e m e n t  
c a p a b i l i t y  i n d i c a t o r s  
 
As a result of our counting of support and challenge factors we observe that the 
potentially most stable country in spite of its ethno-national internal threat is Sri 
Lanka, the potentially most unstable country is India with its various internal and 
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external conflicts. On the whole, all four countries are situated in the second half of 
the scale with their rank positions between 51 and 73 for their capability to master 
challenges. 
 
Table 2: South Asian countries according to their potentiality of conflict 
management 
 
Rank State Challenges  Rank State Support  Rank State Capability 
11 India 3,8  43 Sri Lanka 3,4  51 Sri Lanka 1,9 
24 Bangladesh 2,5  45 India 3,2  67 Bangladesh 0,3 
25 Pakistan 2,4  49 Bangladesh 2,8  71 Pakistan -0,3 
34 Sri Lanka 1,5  53 Pakistan 2,2  73 India -0,6 
 
Legend: The scale for the indexes for the challenges ranges from 5.5 as the most challenged 
country to 0.1 as the less challenged country; the scale for support lies between 9.5 with 
highest and 0.9 with the lowest support; finally, the capability index ranges from 8.3 to -
4.6. 
 
According to the latest evaluation for 2000 India and Bangladesh are counted as 
democracies whereas Pakistan and Sri Lanka figure among transition countries.13 
However, regime change has been noticed, with the exception of India, for all the 
other countries. Bangladesh was counted as autocratic in the 80ies and non-
democratic in the 70ies; only in the 90ies it figured among democratic and ‘partly 
free’ according to Freedom House. Pakistan was up to the 80ies autocratic or 
transitional and only in the 90ies democratic switching to transitional in 2000. Sri 
Lanka changed from democratic up to the 90ies to transitional at the end of the 
century. As to the normative index for the polities all four countries lived with 
restrictions concerning their freedom of participation and expression (India only in 
the 90ies). 
Table 2 shows that the most challenged countries are the two democracies of 
India and Bangladesh; the relatively less challenged country of Sri Lanka shows a 
higher rank in its support index and with that bolster it manages to be top ranked as 
its potential capability to master conflicts is concerned. The most challenged 
country, India, is potentially less equipped to deal successfully with challenges. On 
the whole, the index of potential management capabilities shows no clear 
discrimination between the two democratic states and the transitional regimes. 
 
C O N C L U S I O N S .  E X P L A I N I N G  C O N F L I C T  B E H A V I O R  
 
The analysis shows that the South Asian region is diversified as to culture, 
economics, social and, therefore, does not show a homogeneous political 
entity. On the contrary, the indicators of challenges and security reflect this 
fragmentation and even segmentation. Accordingly, the map of political 
conflicts shows sub-regional clusters of conflicts such as: 
 
 
                                                 
13 For indicators and their operationalization, see Appendix I. 
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• Conflicts that are related to independence;  
• Conflicts that result from the post-colonial area, that about state building 
with new regimes to be installed and about frontiers to be drawn. There 
were disputes after independence foremost about the dismemberment of 
former British India, i.e. the long standing Kashmir conflict between 
India and Pakistan, the frontier conflict between India and China;  
• Conflicts that have occurred within all four states (11 in India, 3 each in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) as internal ethnic and/or religious 
break out. Demands for autonomy and even secession could be observed 
in multicultural India with eleven of such clashes, foremost in Assam 
and Punjab; in Bangladesh foremost with the Shanti Bahini in the region 
of the Chittagong-Hill; in Pakistan with the Karachi upheavals and with 
the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. 
• The conflicts that we observed in the four countries are mostly 
longstanding and enduring; as of the year 2002 one is in high tension 
(Kashmir) and another deescalating (Tamil in Sri Lanka). 
• Especially the Kashmir conflict deserves a special and individual 
treatment since it is the most serious and endangering conflict with two 
nuclear powers involved, with already two wars having been fought and 
it accumulates not only ethnic and religious quarrels but also the support 
from both states. This conflict has features of the Cold War conflict 
(without blocks on both sides) in the sense that it hopefully does not 
escalate into a nuclear catastrophe if both sides are aware of the potential 
damage a war may produce. A negotiated solution may only be possible 
if both sides realize that they cannot win but rather lose. A hurting 
stalemate could bring the two sides to the negotiation table. 
 
How does the dependent variable ‘conflict’ match the independent variables 
‘challenge’, ‘support’ and potential ‘management capability’? Are there 
hints that the chosen variables contribute to the explanation of conflict 
behaviour of the countries under consideration? 
It should be clear from the outset that the explanatory factors chosen are 
more or less quantitative structural factors that translate only indirectly 
psychological factors like perception, motivations, feelings of threat and/or 
security. Equally, this quantitative approach captures only some of the 
features of individual conflicts. Of course, each conflict has characteristics 
and a life cycle of its own. These case specific features are not all included 
in the data sets we compiled. Historians often claim that such a quantitative 
approach gets apples and oranges mixed up. The answer to this is that even 
though apples and oranges are different they have features in common, since 
they are both fruit, they both have a peel and kernels etc. Thus, the 
comparative quantitative approach captures such common to all features of 
conflicts and we claim that they are the most relevant ones and are able to 
express implicitly also features that are difficult to be expressed in 
numerical terms. 
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As a result of our exercise of measuring conflicts together with their driving 
forces we come to the following conclusion: By comparing the indices of 
the explanatory variables with the scores given to the country’s conflict 
behavior we can conclude that the empirical evidence does not contradict 
the hypothesis that the selected factors can explain the political behavior of 
the countries. The country with the highest challenge and the lowest 
capability index, India, has also the highest score in conflict behavior. The 
country with the lowest challenge index, Sri Lanka, has also a low conflict 
record. In addition, Sri Lanka has the highest support and capability index 
of the four countries. These findings suggest that the selected factors may 
contribute to the explanation of the regional map in South Asia. 
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Appendix I: Indicators for regime variables 
 
Survey of all indicators and their operationalization 
Indicator Operationalization Source 
Regimes 
1. Democracies, subset  
OECD-States 
 
For the typology at the end of the nineties: Index of 
democracy by Vanhanen, Freedomhouse, polity values by 
Gurr and Index of democracy by Vanhanen. For the 
typology covering decades 40 to 2002 there are polity-
values by Gurr and the index of democracy by Vanhanen. 
 
Vanhanen/ Gurr/ 
Freedomhouse 
2. Transitory regimes 
 
3. Autocratic regimes 
 
Gurr (Polity IV Project): For democracy: Competition 
about political participation; openness and competition 
about the recruitment of political staff; limitation of the 
executive. For autocracies: Competition about political 
participation; rule of participation; openness and 
competition about the recruitment of political staff; 
limitation of the executive. Values between +10 (highly 
democratic) to –10 (highly autocratic) 
Vanhanen: Competition, participation. Competition: 100 
minus of the percentage of votes of the strongest party. 
Participation: Part of active electors of total population. 
Index of democracy (ID): Competition*participation/100 
Freedomhouse (State of freedom): Values between 1 and 
7; 1 stands for the highest degree of freedom, 7 for the 
lowest one. F= free (average between 1.0 and 2.5), NF= 
not free (average between 5.5. and 7.0), PF= partly free 
(average between 3.0 and 5.5.) 
 
Potential danger 
 
Minorities according to Vanhanen: Heterogeneity = 100 
minus the part of the largest group in a state; Gurr: The 
index of Gurr covers values between –7,03 to 2,10. –7,03 
stands for the lowest, 2,10 for the highest probability 
concerning further rebellions of minorities or the 
escalation of existing rebellions of minorities (degree of 
protest/rebellion). For the index of endangerment the 
figures have been transformed in a proportional scale 
where –7,03 means an endangerment of 0% and 2,1 one 
of 100%. 
 
 
Vanhanen 1990 
 
Political instability/crisis: number of refugees related to 
total population; refugees of country of origin are 
weighted with factor 1, those of country of destination 
with factor 0,33 
 
UNHCR: Statistical 
Overviews, 
different volumes 
 
Endangerment: Military spending related to GNP  SIPRI 2001 
 
Neighbouring countries: Number of neighbouring states Fischer 
Weltalmanach 2002 
 
Non-constitutional change of government; number of 
coups/attempted coups 
KOSIMO 
Security-causing 
factors 
 
Acceptance of regime: voter turnout in % of total 
population  
 
 
Vanhanen 1998 
 
Political integration: Number of memberships in alliances 
and systems of integration (weighted) 
 
Fischer 
Weltalmanach 2002 
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Economic integration: export share Worldbank: World 
development report 
2000/01 
 
Governance, conflict management: political stability of 
regimes and effectivity of governments (work) 
D.Kaufmann/ 
A.Kraay, P.Zoido-
Lobatón 2002 
Potential for resolution 
 
 
 
Security potential minus endangerment potential, 
reduction from one level of escalation to another; win in a 
defensive war 
 
 
KOSIMO 
Conflicts 1: internal + 
neighbouring conflicts, 
weighted by intensity 
 
 
Number of internal and neighbouring conflicts. Weighting 
with 4 for wars, factor 3 for serious conflicts, factor 2 for 
conflicts and factor 1 for latent conflicts according to 
KOSIMO. Data are related to indices 
 
Conflicts 2: Number of 
observed conflicts, 
without weighting, 
violent and non-violent 
conflicts 
 
 
 
 
Actual resolution 
 
International political (not economic) treaties concerning 
peace, armistice, independence, international arbitration, 
court decisions, constitutional amendment/new 
constitution, internal armistice, peace treaties. 
 
 
 
Date 
All data for conflict resolution apply to the nineties. 
Conflict data and regime data are available for the five 
decades 1950 to 1999 
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Appendix II: Conflicts according to issues 
 
Decolonization, Independence, Secession 
 
Name Start End 
India I (independence) 1942 1947 
India II (partition) 1942 1948 
India III (Junagadh) 1947 1948 
India IV - Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947 1949 
India VI (Mahe) 1948 1954 
India IX (Goa I) 1950 1961 
India XI (Rann of Kutch I) 1956 1964 
India XII (Goa II) 1961 1961 
India XIV - Pakistan (Kashmir III) 1965 1965 
India XVI - Pakistan (Kashmir IV) 1965 1970 
India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) 1992 2001 
India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) 1981 1991 
India XXIII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) 1988 1998 
India XXIII - Pakstian (Kashmir V) 1999 2002 
Pakistan (Bangladesh II) 1971 1971 
 
National power 
 
Name Start End 
India V (Hyderabad) 1948 1948 
India XV (Rann of Kutch II) 1965 1969 
India XIX (Assam I) 1983 1984 
India-Nepal 1989 1990 
Pakistan (Bangladesh III) 1971 1971 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (uproar) 1971 1971 
Sri Lanka (Tamils III) 1987 1995 
Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) 1995 2002 
 
International power 
 
Name Start End 
India I (independence) 1942 1947 
India VI (Mahe) 1948 1954 
India IX (Goa I) 1950 1961 
India XII (Goa II) 1961 1961 
India XXII (Intervention in Sri 
Lanka) 1987 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
Border and Territory 
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Name Start End 
Bangladesh- India 1999 2000 
Bangladesh- India 2001 2002 
Bangladesh-Farakha 1975 1999 
India III (Junagadh) 1947 1948 
India VIII - Pakistan (Kashmir II) 1949 1964 
India XI (Rann of Kutch I) 1956 1964 
India XIV - Pakistan (Kashmir III) 1965 1965 
India XV (Rann of Kutch II) 1965 1969 
India XVI - Pakistan (Kashmir IV) 1965 1970 
India XXII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) 1988 1998 
India XXII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) 1999 2002 
India-Pakistan (Siachen-glacier) 1984 1991 
Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) 1995 2002 
 
Ethnic, religious Conflicts 
 
Name Start End 
Bangladesh (Chakma, Marma) 1975 1987 
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) 1971 1990 
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) 1991 2001 
India II (partition) 1942 1948 
India IV - Pakistan (Kashmir I) 1947 1949 
India V (Hyderabad) 1948 1948 
India X (Nagas) 1950 1964 
India XIII (Mizo) 1964 1972 
India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) 1992 2001 
India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) 1981 1991 
India XIX (Assam I) 1983 1984 
India XX (Ayodhya) 1984 1990 
India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) 1987 1997 
India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) 1998 2002 
Pakistan (Bangladesh I) 1966 1970 
Pakistan (Bangladesh III) 1971 1971 
Pakistan (Belushistan) 1973 1976 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Tamils I) 1956 1958 
Sri Lanka (Tamils II) 1983 1987 
Sri Lanka (JVP-Rebellion (-1989) 
(Tamils III) 1987 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
System Conflicts 
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Name Start End 
Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) 2001 2002 
Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) 1977 2000 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Tamils I) 1956 1958 
 
Resources, Water Conflicts 
 
Name Start End 
India XV (Rann of Kutch II) 1965 1969 
India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) 1987 1997 
India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) 1998 2002 
Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) 1995 2002 
 
Appendix III: List of all conflicts 
 
Name Start End Items and Issues Intensity 
Bangladesh  
(Chakma, Marma) 1975 1987 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Severe crises 
Bangladesh  
(Chittagong Hill Tracts) 1971 1990 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy  Crisis 
Bangladesh  
(Chittagong Hill Tracts) 1991 2001 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy  Latent conflict 
Bangladesh-India 1999 2000 Territory Crisis 
Bangladesh-India 2001 2002 Territory  Severe crisis 
Bangladesh-Farakha 1975 1999 Territory  Latent conflict 
India I  
(independence) 1942 1947 Decolonization; International Power Severe crisis 
India II  
(partition) 1942 1948 
Decolonization; ethnic, religious or 
regional Autonomy War 
India III  
(Junagadh) 1947 1948 Territory; Decolonization Crisis 
India IV - Pakistan  
(Kashmir I) 1947 1949 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Territory; Decolonization War 
India V  
(Hyderabad) 1948 1948 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Internal Power  Severe crisis 
India VI  
(Mahe) 1948 1954 Decolonization; International Power Severe crisis 
India VII  
(Indus-channel) 1948 1960 Resources  Latent conflict 
India VIII - Pakistan  
(Kashmir II) 1949 1964 Territory Severe crisis 
India IX  
(Goa I) 1950 1961 Decolonization; International Power Crisis 
India X  
(Nagas) 1950 1964 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Severe crisis 
India XI  
(Rann of Kutch I) 1956 1964 Territory; Secession Severe crisis 
India XII  
(Goa II) 1961 1961 Decolonization; International Power Severe crisis 
India XIII  
(Mizo) 1964 1972 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Crisis 
India XIV - Pakistan  1965 1965 Territory; Secession Severe crisis 
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Name Start End Items and Issues Intensity 
(Kashmir III) 
India XV  
(Rann of Kutch II) 1965 1969 Territory; Internal Power; Resources  Severe crisis 
India XVI - Pakistan  
(Kashmir IV) 1965 1970 Territory; Secession War 
India XVIII  
(Khalistan/Punjab) 1992 2001 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Secession Crisis 
India XVIII  
(Khalistan/Punjab) 1981 1991 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Secession Severe crisis 
India XIX  
(Assam I) 1983 1984 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
National Power  Severe crisis 
India XX  
(Ayodhya) 1984 1990 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Severe crisis 
India XXI  
(Assam II, Bodoland) 1987 1997 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Resources Crisis 
India XXI  
(Assam II, Bodoland) 1998 2002 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Resources Severe crisis 
India XXII  
(Intervention Sri Lanka) 1987 1989 International Power War 
India XXIII - Pakistan  
(Kashmir V) 1988 1998 Territory; Secession Severe crisis 
India XXIII - Pakistan  
(Kashmir V) 1999 2002 Territory; Secession War 
India-Nepal 1989 1990 National Power; Other Crisis 
India-Pakistan  
(Siachen-glacier) 1984 1991 Territory Severe crisis 
Pakistan  
(Bangladesh I) 1966 1970 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Crisis 
Pakistan  
(Bangladesh II) 1971 1971 Secession Severe crisis 
Pakistan  
(Bangladesh III) 1971 1971 Internal power; Autonomy War 
Pakistan  
(Belushistan) 1973 1976 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy Severe crisis 
Pakistan  
(civil strife in Karachi) 1977 2000 Ideology, System Severe crisis 
Pakistan  
(civil strife in Karachi) 2001 2002 Ideology, System Crisis 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon) 
(uproar) 1971 1971 National Power Severe crisis 
Sri Lanka  
(Ceylon) (Tamils I) 1956 1958 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
Ideology, System Severe crisis 
Sri Lanka  
(Tamils II) 1983 1987 Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy War 
Sri Lanka  
(Tamils III) 1987 1995 
Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; 
National Power War 
Sri Lanka  
(Tamils IV) 1995 2002 Territory; National Power; Resources  War 
 
FRANK R. PFETSCH 
 
23 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y  
 
Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Sven Chojnacki. September 2001. Scientific Necessity 
and Political Utility. A Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts. 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin P01-304. 
Freedom House. Comparative Survey of Freedom. Freedom in the World Country 
Ratings. 1972-73 to 2000-01. 
www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/index.htm . 
Gurr, T.R. 2000. Peoples Versus States. Minorities at Risk in the New Century. 
Washington: US Institute of Peace Press. 
Kaufmann,Daniel/Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón. January 2002. Governance 
Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000/01. 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2001.htm . 
KOSIMO: www.kosimo.de . 
Pfetsch Frank R./Peter Billing. 1994. Datenhandbuch nationaler und 
internationaler Konflikte. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Pfetsch, F.R. (Ed.). 1996. Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995. pp. 128-131. 
Pfetsch, F.R. (Ed.). 1990. Konflikte seit 1945. Vol. on ’Asien, Australien und 
Ozeanien’. 
Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. 2000. Kosimo: A Databank on Political 
Conflict. In: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 379-389. 
Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. 2000. National and International Conflicts. 
New Theoretical and Empirical Approaches. London. Routledge. 
Reiter, Dan und Allan Stam. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton UP. 
SIPRI. Yearbook 2001. World Armaments and Disarmament. Oxford: Oxford UP. 
UNCTAD. Handbook of Statistics online: http://stats.unctad.org and 
http://stats.unctad.org/eng/wdsview/assistantP.asp. 
UNHCR. 2000 Global Refugee Trends. Geneva, May 2001; Jan.-Sept. 2001. 
UNHCR. Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR. Statistical Overview 1998, 
1999, 2000. 
UNHCR. Statistical Overviews. Annual Reports. 
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1997. Prospects of Democracy. A study of 172 countries. London. 
Routledge.  
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1994. The Emergence of Democracy. A Comparative Study of 119 
States, 1850-1979. Helsinki.  
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. The Process of Democratization. A Comparative Study of 
147 States, 1980-88. N.Y.: Crane Russak. 
Weltbank: Weltenwicklungsbericht 2000/01. 
 
